STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
- Personal Property3 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190
- Personal Injury/Death2 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190
- Personal Injury/Against Health Provider/After Injury Date3 YearsN.R.S. § 41A.097(2)
- Personal Injury/Against Health Provider/After Discovery Date1 YearN.R.S. § 41A.097(2)
- Breach of Contract/Written6 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190(1)
- Breach of Contract/Oral4 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190(2)(c)
- Breach of Contract/Sale of Goods4 YearsN.R.S. § 104.2725
- Statute of Repose/ProductsN/AN/A
- Statute of Repose/Real Property6 YearsN.R.S. § AB 125, § 2 (2015)*
- Breach of Warranty/Express6 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190
- Breach of Warranty/Implied4 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190
- Workers’ Compensation2 YearsN.R.S. § 616C.215
- Strict Product Liability4 YearsN.R.S. § 11.190
Statute of Limitations Exceptions
*As of February 24, 2015, AB 125 creates one universal statute of repose. Previously, Nevada had a complex statute of repose scheme for construction defect claims. For years it had a different statute of repose based on whether the defect was patent, latent, known to the contractor, or was caused by “willful misconduct” of the contractor. Each statute had a saving clause where if an injury or damage occurred in the last year of the statute of repose, the homeowner had an extra two (2) years to bring the claim. Under the new law, all actions for construction defects must be commenced within six (6) years of substantial completion, unless tolled. New law applies retroactively to actions where substantial completion of the home occurred prior to February 24, 2015. One (1) year grace period for homeowners to bring claims under the prior statutes of repose for homes completed before the effective date of AB 125 that would otherwise be time barred. N.R.S. § AB 125, § 2 (2015).
Contributory Negligence/Comparative Fault
Modified Comparative Fault: 51% Bar. Damaged party cannot recover if it is 51% or more at fault. If 50% or less at fault, it can recover, although its recovery is reduced by its degree of fault. If plaintiff’s negligence is less than combined negligence of the defendant’s fault, he can only recover damages not attributable to his own fault. N.R.S. § 41-141.
Med Pay/PIP Subrogation
Med Pay: No. Subrogation clauses violate public policy and are void. Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 728 P.2d 812 (Nev. 1986).
The two (2) year personal injury statute of limitations runs from the date of the insured’s accident. N.R.S. § 11.190.
PIP: Coverage not applicable. First-party Med Pay coverage available instead.
Automobile: Pro-Rata. Nev. Admin. Code § 686A.680 provides: “An insurer shall, upon claimant’s request, include first-party claimant’s deductible, if any, in subrogation demands. A subrogation recovery must be shared on proportionate basis with first-party claimant, unless deductible amount has been otherwise recovered. No deduction for expenses may be made from deductible recovery unless an outside attorney is retained to collect recovery. The deduction may then be for no more than pro-rata share of allocated loss adjustment expense.”
An insurer is not required to add an insured’s deductible or uninsured loss to its subrogation action; maintaining two separate suits (i.e., one by insured and another by insurer) is not considered a “splitting of actions.” Smith v. Hutchins, 566 P.2d 1136 (Nev. 1977).
Deductible must be included in any collision subrogation demand upon claimant’s request.
Made Whole Doctrine
Until recently, Nevada had not addressed the application of the Made Whole Doctrine. In previous decisions, the court seemed to discount the application of a Made Whole Doctrine in the context of an ERISA subrogation action. Trustee of Hosp. Employees & Restaurant Employees Int’l Union Welfare Fund v. Kirby, 890 F. Supp. 939 (D. Nev. 1995). However, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Nevada declared that the Made Whole Doctrine was a general equitable principle of insurance law that prevented an insurance company from enforcing its subrogation rights before the insured had been fully reimbursed for their losses. Canfora v. Coast Hotels and Casinos, Inc., 121 P.3d 599 (Nev. 2005). However, the court went on to say that if a contract exclusively excludes the Made Whole Doctrine, the doctrine will not apply to limit an insurance company’s subrogation rights. Id.
Economic Loss Doctrine
Majority Rule Majority Rule (exception for owners of new homes). The Supreme Court of Nevada has explained that the ELD marks the fundamental boundary between contract law, which is designed to enforce the expectancy interests of the parties, and tort law, which imposes a duty of reasonable care and thereby generally encourages citizens to avoid causing physical harm to others. Terracon Consultants W., Inc. v. Mandalay Resort Grp., 206 P.3d 81 (Nev.2009). To accomplish this purpose, the ELD bars unintentional tort actions when the plaintiff seeks to recover purely economic losses. Id. A plaintiff may not recover economic loss under theories of strict products liability or negligence. Calloway v. City of Reno, 993 P.2d 1259 (Nev.2000), overruled on other grounds by, Olson v. Richard, 89 P.3d 31 (Nev.2004). When an integrated component of a product, such as a building’s heating or plumbing system, fails and causes damage to the larger product but not to other property, only economic loss has occurred. Tharaldson Fin. Grp., Inc. v. AAF McQuay Inc., 2014 WL 4829649 (D. Nev. 2014). When an integral component of a product – including a building – fails and damages the larger product, only economic loss occurs and, thus, tort recovery is barred. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Sloan Valve Co., 2011 WL 5598324 (D. Nev. 2011).
Whether an HVAC unit which had been installed in the property for over a year is considered an integral part of the property is a question of fact. In Calloway, the Supreme Court of Nevada specifically held that “a building’s heating and plumbing system is a necessary and integrated part of the greater whole. Consequently, when a heating and plumbing system damages the building as a whole, the building has injured itself and only economic losses have occurred.” Calloway, 993 P.2d at 1268. A toilet flush valve is an integrated and integral part of a building. Sloan Valve Co., supra. Therefore, while it may be a question of fact whether some products installed in buildings retain their separate identity as products, in Nevada, an installed HVAC unit is an integrated and integral part of the building, and damage to the property caused by the HVAC is purely economic loss. Damage to other property beyond the building in which the HVAC unit is an integrated part is not a purely economic loss. Callaway, supra.
It is not uncommon for the lessor to provide fire insurance on leased property. As a matter of sound business practice, the premium to be paid had to be considered in establishing the rental rate. Such premiums would be chargeable against the rent as an overhead or operating expense. Accordingly, the tenant actually paid the premium as part of the monthly rental. Courts consider it an undue hardship to require a tenant to insure against his own negligence, when he is paying, through his rent, for the fire insurance which covers the premises. A fire insurer is not entitled, as subrogee, to bring an action against a tenant to recover for amounts paid to the landlord for fire damage to rental premises caused by the tenant’s negligence in absence of express agreement between the landlord and tenant to the contrary. The landlord and tenant are co-insureds under fire policy. Safeco Ins. Co. v. Capri, 705 P.2d 659, 661 (Nev. 1985). Absent an express provision in the lease establishing the tenant’s liability for loss from negligently started fires, courts find that the premises insurance was obtained for the mutual benefit of both parties and that the tenant stands in the shoes of the insured landlord for the limited purpose of defeating a subrogation claim. In short, they are an “implied co-insured.” Rizzuto v. Morris, 592 P.2d 688 (Wash. App. 1979); Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Auto Spring Sup. Co., 59 Cal.App.3d 860 (1976).
Tort of Spoliation: Nevada does not recognize a separate tort for first-party or third-party spoliation of evidence. Timber Tech Engineered Bldg. Products v. The Home Ins. Co., 55 P.3d 952, 953-54 (Nev. 2002). However, a negligence claim for spoliation may exist where the circumstances of the case show that the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff to preserve evidence. Contreras v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp.3d 1208 (D. Nev. 2015).
Adverse Inference: “It is well-established that a party is entitled to jury instructions on every theory of her case that is supported by the evidence.” Bass-Davis v. Davis, 117 P.3d 207, 209 (Nev. 2005). In Reingold v. Wet ‘N Wild Nevada, Inc., 113 Nev. 967, 970, 944 P.2d 800, 802 (Nev. 1997), the Nevada Supreme Court recognized that under N.R.S. § 47.250(3), when evidence is willfully destroyed, the trier of fact is entitled to presume that the evidence was adverse to the destroying party. It further held that evidence is “willfully” destroyed even if the evidence is destroyed pursuant to an established company policy. Bass-Davis v. Davis, 117 P.3d at 210.
Property Damage / Personal Injury. Joint and several liability imposed on parents when a child willfully causes injury to person or damage to property. N.R.S. § 41.470.
The limit of liability is $10,000.00.
Firearms. Liability imposed on parents for a child’s negligent or willful misuse of a firearm, if child has been adjudicated delinquent or convicted of criminal offense, parent knows of child’s propensity to commit violent acts, and parent knows that child intends to use firearm, or permits child to use firearm. N.R.S. § 41.472.
There is no limit to liability.
Auto Liability. Joint and several liability imposed on parents who signs a child’s driver’s application and child willfully or negligently causes injury or property damage while operating motor vehicle, or motorcycle. N.R.S. §§ 483.300, 486.101.
There is no limit to liability.
Child must be under 18-years-old.
Modified Joint and Several Liability. Several liability, except for (1) strict liability, defendants acting in concert, (2) environmental torts, or ordinary negligence where the plaintiff is fault free – then joint and several liability applies to all at-fault defendants. N.R.S. § 41-141; GES, Inc. v. Corbitt, 21 P.3d 11 (Nev. 2001); Buck by Buck v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 783 P.2d 437 (Nev. 1989).
Where two or more persons become jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property or for the same wrongful death, there is a right of contribution among them even though judgment has not been recovered against all or any of them. The right of contribution exists only in favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his equitable share of the common liability, and the tortfeasor’s total recovery is limited to the amount paid by the tortfeasor in excess of his equitable share. No tortfeasor is compelled to make contribution beyond his own equitable share of the entire liability. A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable. N.R.S. § 17.225. Joint tortfeasor has right of contribution unless he settles with the claimant prior to judgment. Judgment against one tortfeasor does not discharge the other tortfeasors from liability, nor does the satisfaction of the judgment impair the right of contribution. N.R.S. § 17.225; Van Cleave v. Gamboni Construction, 706 P.2d 845 (Nev. 1985). Contribution plaintiff may seek contribution during the original proceeding or in separate proceeding filed within one (1) year of final judgment.
Suspension of Drivers' Licenses
Administrative Suspension: If Department determines that the operator did not have insurance, it will suspend the driver’s license of a resident driver or the operating privilege of a non-resident driver, unless the uninsured driver deposits security in an amount determined by the Department. N.R.S. § 485.190(2). License remains suspended until two (2) years have elapsed and no action is filed against the uninsured driver, or evidence of a release or adjudication of non-liability is filed with the Department. N.R.S. § 485.230.
Judgment: Upon receipt of the unsatisfied judgment, the Department will suspend the license of the judgment debtor. N.R.S. § 485.302(1). Suspension will continue until the judgment is stayed or satisfied, and proof of financial responsibility is shown. N.R.S. § 485.303.
Contact Information: Nevada Dept. of Motor Vehicles, Driver’s License, 555 Wright Way, Carson City, NV 89711, (775) 684-4830, http://www.dmvnv.com/nvdl.htm.
Prohibits Broad Indemnity. Applies to Residential Construction Contracts. N.R.S. § AB 125, § 2 (2015).
Effective 2/24/15, indemnification clauses in residential construction contracts requiring a subcontractor to indemnify the general contractor/developer for the contractor’s negligence (whether active, passive, or intentional) are void and unenforceable as against public policy. However, AB 125 specifically states that its anti-indemnity provision does not apply to indemnity and defense agreements that require a subcontractor to indemnify and defend the general contractor or the developer for claims based on the subcontractor’s scope of work.
Diminution of Value
First Party: Currently no applicable Nevada court decisions can be found regarding recovery allowed for diminution in value in a first-party claim. However, Nevada statutory law provides that when an insurer elects to repair a vehicle, the only requirement is that the insurer restores the damaged vehicle to its condition before the loss. No mention is made of payment for residual diminished value. Nev. Admin. Code § 686A.680.
Third Party: No court decisions regarding recovery allowed for diminution in value of a damaged vehicle in a third-party claim.
Mixed: It is unlawful to surreptitiously record any private in-person communication without the consent of one of the parties to the conversation. The consent of all parties is required to record or disclose the content of a telephonic communication. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.620; Nev. Rev. Stat. § 200.650.
The Nevada Supreme Court held in Lane v. Allstate that an individual must have the consent of all parties in order to lawful record a telephonic communication even if they are a party to said communication. Lane v. Allstate Ins. Co., 114 Nev. 1176, 969 P.2d 938 (1998).
Nevada courts may award restitution to a “victim” when proper, in an amount they determine appropriate. N.R.S. § 176.033(1)(c). Nevada case law, however, has determined that an insurer does not qualify as a “victim” for restitution purposes. Martinez v. State, 115 Nev. 9, 974 P.2d 133 (1999).
Health and Disability Insurance
Statute of Limitations: 2 Years. N.R.S. § 11.190. Action Against Health Care Provider – 3 years from injury date or 1 year from date of discovery. N.R.S. § 41A.097(2).
Subrogation of Medical and Disability Benefits are allowed. N.R.S. § 41.100(5).
Made Whole Doctrine does apply, but doctrine can be overridden by clear policy language. See Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 121 Nev. 771, 778, 121 P.3d 599, 604 (2005); See also, Welday v. Summerlin Life & Health Ins. Co., 127 Nev. 1185 (2011).
Common Fund Doctrine applies. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472 (1980).
Funeral Procession Traffic Laws
Nevada is the only state which specifically allows the lead or escort vehicle in a funeral procession to go through a red light. The law authorizes a vehicle escorting a funeral procession to (1) go through a red light or stop sign after slowing down as necessary, (2) exceed the posted speed limit by up to 15 miles per hour to overtake the procession and direct traffic at the next intersection, and (3) disregard regulations on direction of movement or turning when directing the movement of the other vehicles in the procession. Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484B.700. While these privileges are part of the law authorizing special actions by police and other emergency vehicles, the law does not expressly require a funeral escort vehicle to be such a police or emergency vehicle.
Statute of Limitations: 2 Years. N.R.S. § 616C.215.
Can Carrier Sue Third Party Directly: Yes.
Recovery from UM/UIM Benefits: Employer’s Policy Only.
Subrogation Against Medical Malpractice: Yes.
Subrogation Against Legal Malpractice: Undecided.
Recovery Allocation/Equitable Limitations: None.
Employer Contribution/Negligence: No.
Attorney’s Fees/Costs: Breen Formula
Future Credit: Yes.
Auto No-Fault: No.
Dog Bite Laws
No civil liability statute for an average dog bite. The common law for liability, however, states that if the plaintiff can prove that the dog owner’s negligence led to the dog bite injury, the plaintiff may recover damages for the dog bite injury. Section 202.500 makes owner guilty of felony if “vicious” dog (has previously inflicted serious personal injury) bites as opposed to merely a “dangerous” (two bites within 18 months) dog. Nev. Stat. Ann. § 202.500.
Employee Leasing Laws
Provided there is a written agreement between the employee leasing company and the client company, as well as meeting several other conditions set forth in the Nevada’s statute, an employee leasing company in compliance with the leasing provisions set forth in the Act is considered the employer for purposes of the Act. N.R.S. § 616B.691.
Condominium Waiver of Subrogation Laws
Associations’ insurance policies must insure each unit owner in regards to the common elements. The insurer also must waive right of subrogation against unit owners and members of their household. N.R.S. § 116B.570.
Automobile Total Loss Thresholds
Percentage of Value: 65%
Vehicle damage exceeds 65% of the fair market value. N.R.S. § 487.790(1)(b).
Sudden Medical Emergencies While Driving
Sudden Emergency Doctrine. Only appropriate when an unexpected condition confronts the driver while they were exercising reasonable care. Defendant must show they were suddenly placed in a position of peril through no negligence of their own. Posas v. Horton, 228 P.3d 457 (Nev. 2010).
No cases using the sudden emergency defense for a medical emergency.
State Sovereign Immunity And Tort Liability
Tort Claims Act: Nevada Tort Claims Act. N.R.S. §§ 41.031 through 41.0337 (1965).
Notice Deadlines: A claim must be filed with the Attorney General within two years after the cause of action accrues. Filing a claim is not a condition precedent to bringing an action against the State. N.R.S. § 41.036.
Claims/Actions Allowed: Nevada hereby waives its immunity from liability and action and consents to have its liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied to civil actions against natural persons, except as otherwise provided. N.R.S. § 41.031.
Comments/Exceptions: No action may be brought against the State or its employees which are based upon:
(1) an act or omission of an officer or employee exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, or in the performance of a discretionary act;
(2) failure to inspect any building, structure, vehicle, street, public highway or other public work, to determine any hazards, deficiencies or other matters, whether or not there is a duty to inspect;
(3) an injury sustained from a public building or public vehicle by a person who was engaged in any criminal act.
N.R.S. § 41.032, § 41.033 and § 41.0334.
Damage Caps: Damages against the State may not exceed the sum of $100,000. The State will not pay punitive damages. N.R.S. § 41.035.
Recovery of Sales Tax After Vehicle Total Loss
First-Party Claims: Insurer must (1) offer a cash settlement based upon the actual cost of a “comparable auto” including all applicable taxes and other fees, or (2) offer a replacement comparable auto including all applicable taxes, license fees, and other fees. Nev. Admin. Code § 686A.680.
Third-Party Claims: No applicable statute, case law, or regulation governing recovery of sales tax.
Damage to Property Without Market Value
Service Value: Plaintiff is entitled to damages based upon the property’s special value to the plaintiff. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008).
Intrinsic Value: When property’s value to the owner exceeds its market value, the owner may be compensated for its special value, which is measured by “factors apart from those entering into exchange value that cause the article to be more desirable to the owner than to others.” Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008).
Sentimental Value: Sentimental damages are recoverable. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. v. Thitchener, 192 P.3d 243 (Nev. 2008).
Municipal/County/Local Governmental Immunity and Tort Liability
Nevada Tort Claims Act: N.R.S. §§ 41.031 through 41.0337 (1965). Includes “political subdivisions” (counties, cities, school districts, etc.). N.R.S. § 41.031.
Notice Deadlines: None. A claim must be filed with the governing body of the local jurisdiction within two (2) years after cause of action accrues. Filing a claim isn’t a condition precedent to bringing an action against political subdivision. N.R.S. § 41.036.
Claims/Actions Allowed: State waives the immunity of political subdivisions and consents to have their liability determined in accordance with the same rules of law as are applied to civil actions against natural persons, except as otherwise provided. N.R.S. § 41.031. Decision to divert storm water into ditch involved individual judgment or choice and was immune. Warner v. City of Reno, 367 P.3d 832 (Nev. 2010). Operating motor vehicle is not discretionary. Decision to install traffic sign is discretionary, but not duty to maintain. Nevada Power Co. v. Clark Cty., 813 P.2d 477 (Nev. 1991).
Comments/Exceptions: No action may be brought against the political subdivision or its employees which are based upon: (1) the performance of a discretionary act (involves element of individual judgment or choice and is based on considerations of social, economic, or political policy); (2) failure to inspect any building, structure, vehicle, street, public highway or other public work, to determine any hazards, deficiencies or other matters, whether or not there is a duty to inspect; and (3) injury sustained from a public building or public vehicle by a person who was engaged in any criminal act. N.R.S. §§ 41.032, 41.033, 41.0334.
Damage Caps: Damages against political subdivision may not exceed the sum of $100,000, exclusive of interest. The political subdivision will not pay punitive damages. N.R.S. § 41.035.
Laws Regarding using Cell Phones/Headphones/Texting While Driving
Cell Phone/Texting: No person shall operate a motor vehicle while manually using a hand-held device to send, read, or type a non-voice communications message. No person shall operate a vehicle while using a hand-held device in a hand-held manner. Exceptions include emergency personnel, emergency situations or situations that require immediate action. N.R.S. § 484B.165(1)(a) and (b).
Other Prohibitions: No Applicable Laws.
Comments: No agency, board, commission, or political subdivision of the state or local government may regulate the use of telephonic devices by drivers operating motor vehicles. N.R.S. § 707.375.
Workers’ Compensation Claims by Undocumented Employees
Statute: The statute expressly includes “aliens” and includes their status as “legal” and “illegal.” Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 616A.105.
Case Law: Tarango v. State industrial Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175 (Nev. 2001).
Comments/Explanation/Other: *Tarango held that vocational benefits were covered due to the fact that the employee could get employment outside of the U.S.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Admissibility Standards: Other
Case/Statutory Law: Higgs v. State, 222 P.3d 648 (Nev. 2010).
Comments: To the extent that Daubert promulgates a flexible approach to the admissibility of expert witness testimony, the Supreme Court of Nevada has held it is persuasive.
Imputing Contributory Negligence of Driver to Vehicle Owner
Imputed Contributory Negligence Law: Contributory negligence of driver of vehicle is not imputed to owner in action for damages by owner against third party. Rockey Mountain Produce Trucking Co. v. Johnson, 369 P.2d 198 (Nev. 1962).
Family Purpose Statute is “liability” statute and does impute family-purpose driver’s contributory negligence to family-purpose owner in suit against third party for damages. White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969).
Vicarious Liability/Family Purpose Doctrine: No Vicarious Liability Statute.
Family Purpose Statute expanded to impose liability on owner for any negligence of wife, husband, son, daughter, father, mother, brother, sister, or other immediate member of family operating vehicle with permission. Does not require a “family purpose.” N.R.S. § 41.440; Arata v. Faubion, 123 Nev. 153, 161 P.3d 244 (2007).
Sponsor Liability for Minor’s Driving: N.R.S. § 483.300: Joint and several liability imposed on parents who signs a child’s driver’s application and child willfully or negligently causes injury or property damage while operating motor vehicle.
Product Liability Law
Statute of Limitations/Repose: 2 years for personal injury and wrongful death. N.R.S. § 11.190(4)(e). Discovery Rule applies.
Liability Standards: Negligence, Strict Liability, Warranty
Fault Allocations: Modified Comparative. N.R.S. § 41-141(5)(a) and (3).
Non-Economic Caps/Limits On Actual Damages: No.
Punitive Y/N and Limits: Yes (Limits).
Heeding Presumption?: No. Rivera v. Philip Morris, Inc., 209 P.3d 271 (Nev. 2009).
Innocent Seller Statute: No.
Joint and Several Liability: Yes. N.R.S. § 41-141.
Available Defenses: Assumption of Risk; Misuse; Alteration; Learned Intermediary; Inherently Unsafe Products; State of the Art; Government Contractor Defense; Presumption; Compliance With Government Standards; Alcohol/Drugs.
Restatement 2nd or 3rd?: Both.
Owner Liability For Stolen Vehicles
Key In The Ignition Statutes: N.R.S. § 484B.530.
Common Law Rule: The owner or bailee of a vehicle is ordinarily not, as a matter of law, liable for injuries caused by the negligent operation of the vehicle by a stranger who steals the car. Elliott v. Mallory Electric Corp., et. al., 571 P.2d 397 (Nev. 1977).
An insurer cannot subrogate against its own insured. Harvey’s Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 606 P.2d 1095 (Nev. 1980). An insurer may not subrogate against a co-insured of its insured. While case law indicates that an insurer also may not subrogate against a “coinsured” of its insured, this is only the case when the very loss which is the subject of the subrogated policy is covered by a policy which names the “coinsured” as such. Lumbermen’s Underwriting All. v. RCR Plumbing, Inc., 969 P.2d 301 (Nev. 1998).
Use of Non-Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Aftermarket Crash Parts in Repair of Damaged Vehicles
Authority: Nev. ADC § 686A.240.
Summary: The written estimate must notify the insured that non-OEM parts were used in the repair and that the warranty for non-OEM parts is provided by the manufacturer or distributor, not the auto manufacturer.