STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
- Personal Property5 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4)
- Personal Injury/Death5 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4)
- Personal Injury/Wrongful Death3 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100
- Personal Injury/Medical Malpractice2 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.105
- Breach of Contract/Written6 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120
- Breach of Contract/Oral3 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120
- Breach of Contract/Sale of Goods4 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 400.2-725
- Statute of Repose/ProductsN/AN/A
- Statute of Repose/Real Property10 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.097*
- Breach of Warranty5 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120
- Workers’ Compensation5 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 287.150
- Strict Product Liability5 YearsMo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120
Statute of Limitations Exceptions
*10 Years for actions for improvement to real property. This applies only to persons who perform or furnish, in whole or in part, the design, planning or construction, including architectural, engineering or construction services, of improvement. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.097.
Contributory Negligence/Comparative Fault
Pure Comparative Fault: Damaged parties can recover even if 99% at fault. If plaintiff is negligent, that will reduce the liability of the defendant. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983).
Med Pay/PIP Subrogation
Med Pay: No subrogation because personal injury cause of action not assignable. Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1966).
The five (5) year personal injury statute of limitations runs from the date of the insured’s accident. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (2002).
PIP: No. Same as Med Pay.
Deductible Reimbursement
Automobile: Pro-Rata. Mo. Code Regs. Ann. Tit. 20, § 100-1.050(2)(c) provides: “Insurers, upon claimant’s request, shall include first-party claimant’s deductible, if any, in subrogation demands. Subrogation recoveries shall be shared on proportionate basis with the first-party claimants, unless the deductible amount has been otherwise recovered. No deduction for expenses can be made from the deductible recovery unless outside attorney is retained to collect this recovery. The deduction may then be for only pro-rata share of the allocated loss adjustment expense.”
Deductible must be included in any collision subrogation demand upon claimant’s request.
Property: None.
Made Whole Doctrine
No Missouri state court has directly addressed the respective rights, as between an insurer and its insured, as to a third-party recovery, in the context of a conventional subrogation dispute. There is virtually no Missouri law on the Made Whole Doctrine. In addition, Missouri courts expressly distinguish between contractual subrogation and equitable subrogation and have held that equitable principles (such as the Made Whole Doctrine) simply do not apply to contractual subrogation rights. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Lindell Trust Co., 348 S.W.2d 558 (Mo. App. 1961); Messner v. Am. Union Ins. Co., 119 S.W.3d 642 (Mo. App. 2003). However, in St. Louis Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, 654 F.Supp. 314 (E.D. 1987), the court specifically rejected the Made Whole Doctrine in the context of a surety bond, although it did not refer to the doctrine by name. That court stated:
The Association has cited no authority, however, indicating that under Missouri law the insured’s release of the tortfeasor does not impair the insurer’s right of subrogation unless the insured has been fully reimbursed for his loss. This Court does not believe that Missouri law would support such a result, and the Association’s argument on this point must thus be rejected.
Some have cited the 2002 Missouri Supreme Court decision in Keisker v. Farmer, 90 S.W.3d 71 (Mo. 2002) for the proposition that an insured may keep any subrogation recovery which does not unjustly enrich the insured, and that the insurer cannot recover subrogation proceeds for the amount of its payment where the insured had uninsured damages. Neither is true. The court in Keisker merely found that the insurer could not obtain subrogation proceeds over and above the amount of its insurance payment for its insured’s lost business income by asserting unjust enrichment.
Missouri case law also seemingly contradicts the “Made Whole” Doctrine by holding that an insured can assign an entire cause of action to an insurer even if the insured has recovered less than the full amount of the loss. Steele v. Goosen, 329 S.W.2d 703 (Mo. 1959); Ewing v. Pugh, 420 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. App. 1967); Gen. Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Young, 212 S.W.2d 396 (Mo. 1948); Hoorman v. White, 349 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. App. 1961).
Economic Loss Doctrine
Majority Rule. In a Missouri product liability case, the product must be “defective and unreasonably dangerous”, and the damages recoverable are limited to personal injury or to property other than the property sold, unless the product was rendered useless by some “violent occurrence”. Clevenger and Wright, Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Products, Inc., 625 S.W.2d 906 (Mo. App. 1981) (action by owner of grain silo for damages caused by tornado). If a warranty remedy is not available, the buyer is limited to recovery under a contract theory, which may be subject to defenses based on disclaimer of warranties. Crowder v. Vandendeale, 564 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. 1978) (homeowner sued contractor for failure to build home in workmanlike manner). A subsequent Court of Appeals decision, however, held that a secondary purchaser of goods may recover damages for injury to the goods sold on a negligence theory, even absent a violent occurrence. Groppel Co. v. United States Gypsum, 616 S.W.2d 49 (Mo. App. 1981). The Groppel opinion derived the duty of care for this type of negligence cause of action directly from the implied warranty of merchantability provision in Missouri’s version of §§2-314 through 318 of the U.C.C. The 8th Circuit later resolved the conflict by holding that Clevenger correctly stated the law in Missouri denying recovery for damage to the product only under a negligence theory. R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983). A fraud claim to recover economic losses is precluded by the ELD where plaintiffs’ claims for damages are not above and beyond any mere disappointed commercial expectations or desire to enjoy the benefit of the dealer agreements. Self v. Equilon Enterprises, Inc., 2005 WL 3763533 (E.D. Mo. 2005). The ELD applies to sales of goods, not services.
Landlord/Tenant Subrogation
A tenant may be considered to be “co-insured” under the insurance policy obtained by the lessor where it was clear that the parties intended to look only to insurance, rather than at each other, to pay damages caused by negligence. This intent must be determined from the four corners of the lease. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc. v. Brodsky, 950 S.W.2d 297, 303 (Mo. App. 1997). The Brodsky Court found such intent from a surrender clause of the lease. That clause provided that the lessee would surrender possession of the leased premises to lessor in good condition, “loss by fire, casualty, providence and deterioration excepted.” Where a lease requires the landlord to carry insurance and provides there is to be no subrogation right between the parties, it may be determined that the parties intended to look only to insurance, rather than each other, for any loss or damage to the premises. Rock Springs Realty, Inc. v. Waid, 392 S.W.2d 270, 274 (Mo. 1965). An insurer cannot subrogate against its own insured, since, by definition, subrogation arises only with respect to the insured’s rights against third persons to whom the insurer owes no duty. Therefore, no right of subrogation arises against a person who holds the status of an additional insured, or against a tenant who is determined from the intent of the parties to be an implied “co-insured.” Brodsky, supra. Where a party is required by contract to carry insurance for the benefit of another, that party will be treated as a co-insured. Id.
Spoliation
Adverse Inference: A party who intentionally destroys or significantly alters evidence is subject to an adverse evidentiary inference under the spoliation of evidence doctrine. Baldridge v. Director of Revenue, 82 S.W.3d 212, 222 (Mo. App. 2002). ”[T]he destruction of written evidence without satisfactory explanation gives rise to an inference unfavorable to the spoliator.” Garrett v. Terminal R. Ass’n of St. Louis, 259 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Mo. 1953). “Similarly, where one party has obtained possession of physical evidence which [the party] fails to produce or account for at the trial, an inference is warranted against that party.” State ex rel. St. Louis County Transit Co. v. Walsh, 327 S.W.2d 713, 717 (Mo. App. 1959). “[W]here one conceals or suppresses evidence such action warrants an unfavorable inference.” Id. at 717-18.
When an adverse inference is urged, it is necessary that there be evidence showing intentional destruction of the item, and also such destruction must occur under circumstances which give rise to an inference of fraud and a desire to suppress the truth. In such cases, it may be shown by the proponent that the alleged spoliator had a duty, or should have recognized a duty, to preserve the evidence. Morris v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 895 S.W.2d 73, 77-78 (Mo. App. 1995). “Since the doctrine of spoliation is a harsh rule of evidence, prior to applying it in any given case, it should be the burden of the party seeking its benefit to make a prima facie showing the opponent destroyed the missing [evidence] under circumstances manifesting fraud, deceit or bad faith.” Baldridge, supra. Simple negligence is not sufficient to apply the Adverse Inference Rule. Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 479 S.W.2d 176, 182 (Mo. App. 1972).
Parental Responsibility
Property Damage/Personal Injury. Liability imposed on parents when child purposefully marks or defaces property, or purposefully causes personal injury to another. Vernon’s Ann. Mo. Stat. § 537.045.
Minor’s Driving. Parent will be held liable when they knowingly allow a minor under 16 years of age to use their motor vehicle. Vernon’s Ann. Mo. Stat. § 302.250.
The limit of liability is $2,000.00. Child must be under 18-years-old.
Contribution Actions
Modified Joint and Several Liability. Joint and several liability only where defendants are 51% or more at fault – otherwise several liability. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067; Burg v. Dampier, 346 S.W.3d 343 (Mo. Ct. App. W. Dist. Div. 2 2011).
Joint tortfeasors have a right to contribution. Contribution may be sought in the underlying action or in a separate action. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.060 and 537.067; Safeway Stores, Inc. v. City of Raytown, 633 S.W.2d 727 (Mo. 1982). There is a five year statute of limitations from the date of the settlement or payment of judgment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120 (2002); Greenstreet v. Rupert, 795 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. App. 1990).
Suspension of Drivers' Licenses
Administrative Suspension: If uninsured driver fails to produce the requested information, it will result in suspension of registration of the owner’s motor vehicle and, where applicable, suspension of operator’s driver’s license. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.026(8). Suspension becomes effective thirty (30) days after the notice is deemed received and will last until the person pays a fee and proves that he had insurance. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.041.
Judgment: If a judgment debtor fails to satisfy a final judgment within sixty (60) days, the Clerk of the Court will forward to the Director a certified copy of the judgment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.100. License will no longer be suspended upon proof of satisfaction of judgment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.110.
Contact Information: State of Missouri, Department of Revenue, Division of Motor Vehicle and Drivers Licensing, Harry S. Truman State Office Bldg., 301 West High Street, Jefferson City, MO 65101, (573) 526-2407, http://dor.mo.gov/motorv/.
Anti-Indemnity Statutes
Prohibits Intermediate Indemnity. Applies to Construction Contracts or Agreements. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 434.100.
Not applicable to contracts entered into between state/governmental agencies, and only applicable to contracts entered into after August 28, 1999.
Diminution of Value
First Party: If policy language is unambiguous regarding no coverage for diminution, the diminished value is not a covered loss and the insurer’s liability was capped at either the actual cash value of the auto or the cost to repair or replace the damaged auto itself or with parts or property of like kind and quality. Lupo v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 70 S.W.3d 16 (Mo. App. 2002). However, the Missouri Court of Appeals has held that “If the insurer, permitted to undertake repairs, falls short of substantial restoration of function, appearance and value, the insured, upon proper showing, can recover damages in an amount equal to the difference between the reasonable market value of the insured automobile immediately prior to the upset and its reasonable market value when tendered to plaintiff after repairs.” Williams v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mo., 299 S.W.2d 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957).
Third Party: Although proper measure of damages in an automobile collision case is generally the difference between the market value of automobile before collision and its value after collision, that is not the only measure of damages allowable; also allowable are the cost of repairs and the difference between the market value of the car before the collision and its value after the repairs. Rook v. John F. Oliver Trucking Co., 556 S.W.2d 200 (Mo. App. 1977); Hood v. M. F. A. Mutual Insurance Co., 379 S.W.2d 806 (Mo. App. 1964); Langdon v. Koch, 393 S.W.2d 66 (Mo. App. 1965).
There may be other items of loss, such as cost of preservation and diminution of damage and loss of use, which would be added to the total damage suffered by the owner. and the amount, if any, of the deterioration of the repaired car, being the difference in the reasonable market value of the car immediately before the accident and the reasonable market value of the same after it had been repaired. Gilwee v. Pabst Brewing Co., 193 S.W. 886 (Mo. App. 1917).
Recording Conversations
One-Party Consent: An individual has the right to record or disclose the contents of an oral or electronic communication that they are a party to or if one of the parties has given prior consent to the recording of said communications. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 542.402(2)(3).
Criminal Restitution
A Missouri court has the authority to order that a criminal defendant pay restitution to a “victim” or “any dependent of the victim.” Missouri case law also states that a court will have the ability to award restitution to an insurer who has reimbursed a direct victim. State v. Gladden, 294 S.W.3d 73 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
Health and Disability Insurance
Statute of Limitations: 5 Years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4). Medical Malpractice – 2 Years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.105. Wrongful Death – 3 Years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100.
Subrogation of Medical and Disability Benefits are not allowed. Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Chumbly, 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965).
Funeral Procession Traffic Laws
A funeral procession is defined as two or more vehicles accompanying the body of a dead person from a funeral establishment to the place of final disposition or a place where additional funeral services will be performed. Funeral lead vehicles must have an amber or purple light or lens or alternating flashing headlamps. The law gives the procession the right-of-way, except it must yield to emergency vehicles. Once the lead vehicle lawfully enters an intersection, all other vehicles in the procession may follow without stopping, but must exercise due care. All vehicles in the procession must follow each other as closely as safely possible, and toll-free passage is given to processions on any toll bridges, tunnels, or other roads. Other vehicles are prohibited from driving between, joining, attempting to pass, or crossing the path of a funeral procession. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 194.500-509.
Workers’ Compensation
Statute of Limitations: 5 Years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.150.
Can Carrier Sue Third Party Directly: Yes.
Intervene: Yes, but not required.
Recovery from UM/UIM Benefits: UM – No | UIM – No
Subrogation Against Medical Malpractice: Yes.
Subrogation Against Legal Malpractice: No.
Recovery Allocation/Equitable Limitations: Ruediger Formula.
Employer Contribution/Negligence: No.
Attorney’s Fees/Costs: Pro-Rata.
Future Credit: Yes.
Auto No-Fault: No.
Dog Bite Laws
Dog owner will be held liable for damages to victim, livestock, and property while victim was on public property, or lawfully on private property. However, victim’s damages may be reduced by the percentage that they were at fault. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 273.036.
Employee Leasing Laws
When work is performed under a contract involving leasing or borrowing of an employee, and an injury occurs on or about the premises of the alleged statutory employer and the alleged statutory employee was doing work in the usual course of business of the alleged statutory employer, the worker is considered a statutory employee of the special employer and cannot be sued under the Exclusive Remedy Rule. Wilson v. Altruk Freight Sys., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 717 (Mo. App. 1991). Employee leasing companies are not specifically dealt with in the Workers’ Compensation Act or in case law.
Condominium Waiver of Subrogation Laws
Associations shall maintain property insurance and general liability insurance on the common elements. Policies covering condo properties must waive subrogation against unit owners and members of their household. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 448.3-113.4(2).
Automobile Total Loss Thresholds
Percentage of Value: 80%
Vehicle less than six-years-old and if damaged exceeds 80% of the fair market value. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 301.010(51)(a).
Sudden Medical Emergencies While Driving
Act of God Defense. Although the Sudden Emergency Doctrine is not a defense, Missouri does recognize an Act of God Defense. If driver’s negligence was caused by an Act of God they are not liable if the driver exercised due care prior to the accident. Rohde v. St. Louis Pub. Serv. Co., 249 S.W.2d 417 (Mo. 1952); Arthur v. Royse, 574 S.W.2d 22 (Mo. App. 1978).
An Act of God defense is usually used more commonly in flood damage cases. Kennedy v. Union Elec. Co. of Mo., 216 S.W.2d 756 (Mo. 1948); Robinson v. Missouri State Highway & Transp. Comm’n, 24 S.W.3d 67 (Mo. App. 2000).
State Sovereign Immunity And Tort Liability
Tort Claims Act: Missouri Tort Claims Act. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 537.600 – 537.650 (1978).
Notice Deadlines: Claims against the State shall be brought to the Commissioner of Administration, for approval, within two years after such claim accrues. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 33.120.
Claims/Actions Allowed: The immunity of the State is waived in these instances:
(1) injuries resulting from State employee’s negligent act or omission while operating a motor vehicle within the scope of employment; and
(2) injuries caused by the dangerous condition of a State-owned property.
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.600.
Comments/Exceptions: The Commissioner of Administration and the governing body of each political subdivision of the State may purchase liability insurance for tort claims, made against the State or the political subdivision. Immunity is waived up to the extent of the coverage provided in the policy. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.610.
Damage Caps: Claims shall not exceed $2,000,000 for claims arising out of a single occurrence and shall not exceed $300,000 for any one person in a single accident or occurrence. The State will not pay punitive damages. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.610.
Recovery of Sales Tax After Vehicle Total Loss
First-Party Claims: Unless stated in the policy language, an insurer is not required to reimburse for sales tax. The insured must file a request with the state to have their sales tax refunded. https://insurance.mo.gov/Contribute%20Documents/autoclaimbrochure_002.pdf
Third-Party Claims: No applicable statute, case law, or regulation governing recovery of sales tax.
Damage to Property Without Market Value
Service Value: “…the proper measure of damages was not determined by reference to the fair market value of the church before and after the fire. The appropriate measure of damages, one that would put LMBC in the same position it was in before the fire, was cost of replacement.” Leonard Missionary Baptist Church v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 42 S.W.3d 833 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
Intrinsic Value: “Since it is agreed that the plaintiff’s sales records have no general market value, the plaintiff’s damages must be measured in terms of the value of the records to him.” Oster v. Kribs Ford, Inc., 660 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
Sentimental Value: “If the converted property has no market value, then an alternate measure of damages is the value of the property to the owner, excluding any fanciful or sentimental value that the property may have.” Oliver v. Oliver, 508 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974).
Municipal/County/Local Governmental Immunity and Tort Liability
Legal Authority:
Missouri Tort Claims Act: Mo. Stat. §§ 537.600 – 537.650 (1978). Tort immunity not waived. Modified form of sovereign immunity. Public “entity” includes local government and its employees. Mo. Stat. § 537.602(2). Three immunities: (1) Sovereign immunity; (2) Official Immunity; and (3) Public Duty Doctrine.
Notice Deadlines: Claims against public entity must be brought to the Commissioner of Administration, for approval, within two (2) years after such claim accrues. Mo. Stat. § 33.120.
Claims/Actions Allowed: The immunity of public entity is waived in these instances: (1) injuries resulting from State employee’s negligent act or omission while operating a motor vehicle within the scope of employment; (2) injuries caused by the dangerous condition of a State-owned property and Mo. Stat. § 537.600. (these are absolute waivers); and (3) Contract claims. Kunzie v. City of Olivette, 184 S.W.3d 570 (Mo. 2006).
Comments/Exceptions: Immunity is waived up to the extent of the coverage provided in the policy or self-insurance plan. Mo. Stat. §§ 537.610 (political subdivisions) and 71.185 (municipalities). No immunity for proprietary functions (for benefit or profit of municipality). Immunity only for governmental functions (for common good). Construction and maintenance of sewers is a proprietary function.
Damage Caps: Claims shall not exceed $2,000,000 for claims arising out of a single occurrence and shall not exceed $300,000 for any one person in a single accident or occurrence. Public entity will not pay punitive damages. Mo. Stat. § 537.610. Political subdivision may purchase liability insurance.
No Pay, No Play Laws
Rule: Uninsured motorists injured in an accident waive their ability to pursue a cause of action against the tortfeasor unless it can be proven that the tortfeasor was under the influence at the time of the accident.
Authority: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 303.390
Laws Regarding using Cell Phones/Headphones/Texting While Driving
Cell Phone/Texting: No driver under the age of 21 may send, receive, or read a text message in a hand-held manner while operating a motor vehicle. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 304.820(1).
No applicable laws on cell phone use.
Other Prohibitions: No Applicable Laws.
Comments: Local communities may pass their own laws regarding cell phone use.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Admissibility Standards: Other
Case/Statutory Law: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 490.065; Hawthorne v. Lester E. Cox Medical Centers, 165 S.W.3d 587 (Mo. App. 2005).
Workers’ Compensation Claims by Undocumented Employees
Y/N/U: U
Statute: The statute includes every person in the service of an employer. It is silent on “illegal aliens” and their legal status. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 287.020-1.
Case Law: Undecided
Product Liability Law
Statute of Limitations/Repose: 5 years for personal injury. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 516.120(4) (2002). Wrongful death is 3 years. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.100 (2000). Discovery Rule applies.
Liability Standards: Negligence, Strict Liability, Warranty.
Fault Allocations: Pure Comparative. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.765.1 (2000).
Non-Economic Caps/Limits On Actual Damages: No.
Punitive Y/N and Limits: Yes.
Heeding Presumption?: Yes. Moore v. Ford Motor Co., 332 S.W.3d 749, 762-63 (Mo. 2011); Arnold v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 834 S.W.2d 192, 194 (Mo. 1992).
Innocent Seller Statute: Yes. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.762.1 and .2 (2000).
Joint and Several Liability: Yes. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.067.
Available Defenses: Assumption of Risk; Misuse; Alteration; Learned Intermediary; Inherently Unsafe Products; State of the Art; Government Contractor Defense; Presumption; Alcohol/Drugs; Sophisticated User.
Restatement 2nd or 3rd?: Both.
Imputing Contributory Negligence of Driver to Vehicle Owner
Imputed Contributory Negligence Law: Driver’s contributory negligence cannot be imputed to owner suing third party for damages to vehicle in collision; unless there is joint enterprise. MacArthur v. Gendron, 312 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. App. 1958).
Joint ownership of automobile is not sufficient basis for imputing negligence of driver-spouse to passenger-spouse. Trip for family purpose doesn’t allow for this either. Stover v. Patrick, 459 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1970).
Vicarious Liability/Family Purpose Doctrine: No Vicarious Liability Statute.
Missouri recognizes the Family Purpose Doctrine. Mebas v. Werkmeister, 221 Mo. App. 173, 299 S.W. 601 (1927).
Sponsor Liability for Minor’s Driving: No sponsorship liability statute. However, under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 302.250, a parent will be held liable when they knowingly allow a minor under 16 years of age to use their motor vehicle.
Owner Liability For Stolen Vehicles
Key In The Ignition Statutes: N/A
Common Law Rule: In the absence of special circumstances or of special relationship affecting foreseeability, one who leaves a vehicle unlocked with the keys in the ignition does not owe a duty to third parties arising from accidents involving negligent thieves. Dix v. Motor Mkt., Inc., 540 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Anti-Subrogation Rule
In Missouri, the ASR is referred to as the “No Subrogation Rule.” An insurer has no right of subrogation against its own insured or co-insured for a claim arising from the very risk for which the insured was covered. Benton House, LLC v. Cook & Younts Ins., Inc., 249 S.W.3d 878 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (preempted by FEHBA on other grounds). The ASR prevents subrogation against an insured when the subrogor and target are covered by the same policy. Factory Ins. Ass’n v. Donco Corp., 496 S.W.2d 331 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). If a party is covered by the third-party liability portion of a policy, but not the property damage portion of the policy, an insurer can still subrogate for the damages portion of the policy. Behlmann Pontiac GMC Truck, Inc. v. Harbin, 6 S.W.3d 891 (Mo. 1999). In Harbin, the customer of an auto dealership test drove their insured vehicle which suffered property damage due to the customer/driver. After paying the dealership its claim, the dealer’s insurer commenced a subrogation action against the driver to recover for property damage claim. The driver defended on the grounds that he was an insured under the policy and, therefore, the ASR applied. The trial court granted the driver’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the subrogation action. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, finding that the driver was not an “insured” for property damage to the vehicle and, thus, the rule prohibiting subrogation against an insured did not apply. The court reasoned that the driver was an insured only for the purpose of providing coverage for property damage to the property of others and personal injury claims. Property damage to the insured’s dealer’s vehicle was outside of such coverage and, therefore, subrogation was allowed.
Use of Non-Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Aftermarket Crash Parts in Repair of Damaged Vehicles
Authority: Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.295.
Summary: The insured must be informed by a written estimate that non-OEM parts are going to be used and that the non-OEM parts are warranted by their manufacturer. The statute defines the size and locations of these notifications. All non-OEM parts must be marked with either the name or logo of their manufacturer and they must be visible if at all practicable.